A Powerful Competition Policy - Contents

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"A Powerful Competition Policy"

Contents

• Preface

• Summary

• 1. The Nordic Electricity Sector
  • 1.1 The Reform of the Nordic Electricity Sector
  • 1.2 The Nordic Electricity Sector
    • 1.2.1 Transmission
    • 1.2.2 Consumption and Production
    • 1.2.3 The Electricity Market
    • 1.2.4 Nord Pool
  • 1.3 The Danish Electricity Sector
    • 1.3.1 Network Operation
    • 1.3.2 Production
    • 1.3.3 New Capacity
  • 1.4 The Swedish Electricity Sector
    • 1.4.1 Network Operation
    • 1.4.2 Production
    • 1.4.3 New Capacity
  • 1.5 The Norwegian Electricity Sector
    • 1.5.1 Network Operation
    • 1.5.2 Production
    • 1.5.3 New capacity
  • 1.6 The Finnish power market

• 2. Defining the market
  • 2.1 The sub-markets of the electricity sector
  • 2.2 Definition of the relevant market
  • 2.3 The relevant product market
  • 2.4 The relevant geographic market

• 3. Market Concentration
  • 3.1 The Lerner Index and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
    • 3.1.1 The Lerner Index and the Unadjusted HHI
    • 3.1.2 The Lerner Index and the Incentives Adjusted HHIi
    • 3.1.3 The Normalised Banzhaf Power Index
    • 3.1.4 The Lerner Index and the incentives and control adjusted HHIic
  • 3.2 The Nordic Market
    • 3.2.1 The unadjusted HHI
    • 3.2.2 The incentives adjusted HHIi
    • 3.2.3 The incentives and control adjusted HHIic
  • 3.3 The Finnish Market
    • 3.3.1 The unadjusted HHI
    • 3.3.2 The incentives adjusted HHIi
    • 3.3.3 The incentives and control adjusted HHIic
  • 3.4 The Norwegian Market
    • 3.4.1 The unadjusted HHI
    • 3.4.2 The incentives adjusted HHIi
    • 3.4.3 The incentives and control adjusted HHIic
  • 3.5 The Swedish Market
    • 3.5.1 The unadjusted HHI
    • 3.5.2 The incentives adjusted HHIi
    • 3.5.3 The incentives and control adjusted HHIic
  • 3.6 The Danish Market
  • 3.7 Joint Ownership of Production Plants
  • Appendix

• 4. Market power and its effects
  • 4.1 What is market power?
  • 4.2 Unilateral market power
    • 4.2.1 The residual demand
    • 4.2.2 Factors influencing the elasticity of the residual demand
  • 4.3 Collective market power
    • 4.3.1 Introduction
    • 4.3.2 Incentive to co-operate
    • 4.3.3 Retaliation Mechanisms
    • 4.3.4 Countervailing power
  • 4.4 How to Exert Market Power
  • 4.5 Efficiency Effects

• 5. Market modelling
  • 5.1 Why modelling
  • 5.2 The Eltra Model
  • 5.3 Nordic snapshots of the exertion of market power
  • 5.4 Effects of an inter-Nordic merger

• 6. Legal framework and the scope for increased co-operation
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 The overriding objective of this chapter
  • 6.3 Substantive tests in merger regulation
    • 6.3.1 Market dominance
    • 6.3.2 Substantial lessening of competition
    • 6.3.3 Public interest
  • 6.4 Nordic merger control legislation
    • 6.4.1 Sweden
    • 6.4.2 Norway
    • 6.4.3 Denmark
    • 6.4.4 Finland
  • 6.5 Inter-Nordic merger enforcement - uneven playing field
    • 6.5.1 The EC common market thresholds and national jurisdiction
    • 6.5.2 Scope for co-operation
    • 6.5.3 Existing co-operation agreements
    • 6.5.4 Multilateral discussions between enforcement agencies
  • 6.6 Information sharing between enforcement agencies
  • 6.6.1 Legislation and agreements
  • 6.7 Concluding remarks

• 7. Conclusions and Recommendations
  • 7.1 Competition Concerns on the Nordic Power Market
  • 7.2 Possible Pro-Competitive Actions
  • 7.3 Improved co-operation regarding competition policy

• References

Version 1.0 October 2003 • © Danish Competition Authority.
Published by the Danish Competition Authority, www.ks.dk
Publication produced according to the standard for electronic publication set by the Government