1.1 Competition Promotion

 

 

Annual Report and Accounts 1998
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New Competition Act
With the new Competition Act, which came into force on January 1, 1998, Denmark introduced the same principles of competition regulation as in the EU and in the majority of industrial countries, the socalled prohibition regime. The starting point is that agreements restraining competition are prohibited. This also applies if dominant undertakings abuse their strength to restrain competition. The Danish Competition Act does not include provisions on merger control.

The Act entails a "de minimis" rule for agreements. The main rule is that agreements are not covered by the prohibition if the aggregate turnover of the participants is below DKK 1 billion, and the market share concerned is below 10\%.

Anti-competitive agreements may on certain conditions be exempted from the prohibition. Undertakings may also apply for a statement that the agreement or the practice of the undertaking is not covered by the Act (a negative clearance).

Violation of the prohibition of the Act may be punishable by fine determined by the courts. It is expected that the level of penalty will be substantially higher than was the case under the previous Competition Act.

Notifications under the transition rules

The Act incorporates a transition rule. This will ensure that anticompetitive agreements that were in force at the time of implementation of the Act do not suddenly become prohibited. If the parties submitted their agreements to the Authority prior to July 1, 1998, they may be maintained until they have been evaluated under the stipulations of the new Act.

By July 1, 1998, the Authority had received notifications concerning 1,070 agreements. This was more than anticipated. The majority of the notifications were received in the last days up to July 1. The distribution of the agreements on trades is reflected in the table below.

The Authority gives priority to handling the notifications so that three circumstances are of particular importance:

  • whether the case is of major social importance,
  • whether the case may constitute a model for a certain number of similar cases, or
  • whether it is of importance that a prompt decision be made.

The Authority has drawn up a plan for handling these agreements. The plan allows for the fact that in the beginning the number of principal - and thereby also more labour intensive - cases will be relatively higher. The objective is for the "bulge" of old agreements to be carried through in a maximum of 31/2 years.

 

Notified agreements under the transition rules
in the Competition Act

Number of  agreements

 

Trade:
Agriculture
Food, beverages and tobacco industries
Chemical industry
Other industries 54
Power, gas and heating supply 115
Construction industries 77
Wholesale trade and provision of goods 76
Retail trade 70
Post and telecommunications 68
Banking and financing 123
Insurance 106
Real estate admin. and trade, business service 44
Entertainment, sports, etc. 79
Other trades 90


53
70
45
54
115
77
76
70
68
123
106
44
79
90

Total

1070


 

Production figures, competition cases

 

1995

1996

1997

1998

 

Number of new cases
Number of concluded cases

717
--

835
657

909
766

2406
960

 

Of these:
Proper Council decisions
Executive Committee decisions 1)
Cases of information for the Council
Strictly Authority cases


57
47
104
--


48
49
105
455


40
21
117
588


68
--
75
817

 

1) Note: Under the new Competition Act there is no Executive Committee.

Decisions
Decisions of cases of a fundamental or significant financial importance rest with the Competition Council. The Competition Authority is in charge of the day-to-day administration of the Act, the preparation of cases to be submitted to the Council and on behalf of the Council it decides cases in accordance with practice or in accordance with guidelines set out by the Council.

In 1998, the Competition Council held 10 meetings. At these meetings, the Council made decisions in 68 cases. The Authority made decisions in 960 cases.
The substantial increase in the number of competition cases in 1998 is mainly caused by the many notifications of agreements under the transition rules of the new Competition Act, see further details in the table above. The new Competition Act has also involved a higher number of cases being submitted to the Council for the purpose of determining practice. Below are some fundamental decisions in the main areas of the Act.

Cartel cases
Towards the end of the year, the media reported on possible cartel activities in the building and construction sector. In late 1998 and early 1999 the Authority received more than 100 confessions from undertakings in the electrician trade which participated in illegal co-ordination of tenders. In connection with the disclosure of the cartel, the Authority for the first time made use of its possibility to conduct unannounced control inspections with undertakings. Shortly afterwards, several major undertakings chose to show their hands and contribute towards clearing up the matter.

So far, the work of clearing up has demonstrated that co-operation within tender cartels has been extensive. The Authority gives high priority to the work of disclosing the tender cartels and will allocate substantial resources to this work also in the coming year.

Agreements
According to the new Act the undertakings themselves have to document that anticompetitive agreements offer such benefits that they should be allowed. The four requirements of the Act in order to be exempted from the prohibition of the act are that the agreement:

  • contributes to improving the efficiency of production or distribution of goods or services etc. or to promoting technical or economic progress
  • allows the consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits
  • does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and
  • does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products or services etc. in question.

This has involved prohibition of several agreements that were acceptable under the stipulations of the old Act. In spring 1998, the Authority published guidelines concerning the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements.
The Council has considered agreements and bye-laws of trade associations. Guidance by trade associations may often involve special facilities for the members of the association and a rationalisation of routines. This may benefit customers. But at the same time there is a risk that competition on, say, price and quality is restrained. Therefore the beneficial effects must be balanced against possible harmful effects on competition.
In one concrete application, the Council has indicated that the bye-laws or regulations of a trade association will not generally be covered by the prohibition rules of the Act, in the event that:

  • they do not include regulations on common prices, discounts or terms of payment,
  • they do not significantly impair buyers' possibilities,
  • it is voluntary for the members to follow the regulations.

If all of these conditions are not met, the bye-laws have to be considered specifically.

The main principles are underlined in a number of concrete decisions.

Abuse of a dominant position
The Competition Authority often receives complaints that one undertaking refuses to supply to another undertaking. The starting point for considering these cases is on the one hand the right of the supplier to decide for himself, with whom he wishes to do business. On the other hand, a dominant undertaking shall not in a non-objective manner obstruct others from doing business.

A refusal to supply is covered by the act and thus prohibited in the event that:

  • the supplier holds a dominant position in the relevant market,
  • the supply is of significant importance to the complaining undertaking,
  • the supplier's reason for his refusal to supply is not factual, reasonable, objective, and consequently administered.

Refusal to supply cannot simply be justified by capacity problems. If capacity problems do exist, the undertaking will have to divide supplies among the customers according to reasonable, objective criteria.

The Competition Council has decided a couple of cases on refusal to supply in 1998 where these criteria were laid down.

 

The Council decided that three wholesalers in the field of pharmaceuticals are to discontinue a concerted practice. The wholesalers used the same scale of discount on the sale of non-pharmaceuticals to dispensing chemists. The Council made a point of the fact that the concerted practice removes the incentive of competition among the wholesalers. Each individual wholesaler should himself determine his discount rates on the basis of his own circumstances of expenditure.
The Council prohibited recommended prices of raw wood agreed between an association of major forest owners and an organisation of woodworking industries. The price lists were very detailed and very specifically laid down differences in wood prices in individual districts of the country. The prohibition did not apply to circulation of price statistics.
The Council also decided that the local association branches under a trade association shall cancel their agreements on prices and limitation in the possibility of advertising. The agreements had to be cancelled because competition in the trade was limited by the overall effect of these agreements.

 

Montana Møbler ordered to supply
The Competition Council has ordered that Montana Møbler deliver bookcases to the furniture store of P. Lindegaard Poulsen of Odense on the general terms and conditions of the company.
The Council found that by refusing to supply to Lindegaard Poulsen, Montana Møbler had abused its dominant position in the market for exclusive furniture. In this market, Montana Møbler has a market share of between 25 and 40\%, which under the Competition Act does not in itself constitute a dominant position. However, the company substantiates its high-quality concept by fixing recommended consumer prices. These prices include high retail markups, which the company seeks to maintain by fixing recommended discount rates towards furniture stores. Montana Møbler encourages dealers to contact the company if they wish to change these rates. The Council found that this conduct could only be practised by a dominant undertaking.
The Council ordered Montana Møbler to supply to Lindegaard Poulsen that has an obvious commercial interest in stocking Montana bookcases.

Aalborg Portland's prices for cement
Upon an assessment of Aalborg Portland's prices for cement in the Danish market, the Competition Council found that it is not substantiated that Aalborg Portland abused its dominant position.
Aalborg Portland is the only Danish cement producer. The company has a market share of approx. 85\% and has a dominant influence on production and sale of cement in the Danish market. The remaining part of consumption is covered by two minor cement importers.
Aalborg Portland exports approximately half of their cement production, at approximately 50\% of the price charged to their Danish customers. Moreover, most of their exports are for distant countries, whereas exports to nearby countries (Germany, Sweden and Norway) constitute only a minor part of the company's production. There are no imports from these countries, either.
It was pointed out that Danish cement prices do not differ significantly from prices in the surrounding markets. The Council also pointed out that there are no barriers of any technical or legal nature which prevent increased imports from cement producers in other countries.

Car dealer mark-ups on sale to other EU-citizens
The Competition Council has ordered the Association of Danish Car Dealers (Danmarks Automobilforhandler Forening (DAF)) to specify to the members that even though pricing is free, it is not allowed to encourage a general practice of claiming a higher price merely because the buyer resides outside Denmark.
The order follows a complaint referred by the European Commission for consideration under the Danish Competition Act.
In a circular, DAF had indicated that the individual freedom of the members to lay down prices and discounts could be taken to mean that they were at full legal liberty to set a higher mark-up on sale to non-Danish EU citizens.

Bang & Olufsen ordered to supply
The Competition Council has decided that Bang & Olufsen - on general terms and conditions - shall sell its products to eight selected stores in the Merlin chain and to one Electronic World store.
With reference to its dealer conditions, B&O had refused to enrol the stores as dealers of B&O products. In order to be able to sell B&O products, Merlin had developed a "shop-in-shop" concept that was to meet the general dealer requirements of B&O. However, B&O had referred to the fact that the wish to sell B&O applied only to a few of the stores of the Merlin chain. B&O have appealed the decision.

Scandlines' truck discounts
The Competition Council has decided that Scandlines' truck discounts were distorting competition and were prohibited. The Competition Appeals Tribunal set aside the decision.
In the opinion of the Council, Scandlines held a clearly dominant position in the ferry market in Denmark and to and from Denmark. Scandlines had a market share in this market in excess of 50\%.
The Council found that there was a separate market for ferrying of trucks with two end-to-end ferry crossings. This is due to the fact that Scandlines had special, favourable price conditions by selling tickets for two crossings (combination tickets) compared with the price and discount conditions applying to the sale of one-way tickets.
The Council was of the opinion that in order to remove the distortion of competition, the company had to change price and discount conditions for combination tickets so as to allow a bigger scope for competition. Scandlines should not have the possibility of abusing the monopoly on the Baltic or the dominant position on all other crossings to inflict unreasonable conditions upon its competitors.
However, the Competition Appeals Tribunal did not find that there was any basis for assuming the existence of one market for combination ferrying in Denmark and to and from Denmark.

All of the cases will "stand or fall" with the way in which the relevant market is delimited. The Competition Authority therefore accounted in detail for the delimitation of the relevant market in a guideline published in 1998.

Public activities
The ownership is of no significance to the competition-law assessment. However, it is of significance whether a business activity is subject to public regulation. This is the case whether the regulation applies to a private or a public enterprise. If the regulation involves harmful effects on competition, the Competition Authority may contact the authority concerned and draw attention to the harmful effects of the regulation. Such application may be made public.

During the past year the Council has published only one application. Moreover, in some cases a more informal application has been submitted, since the Council has wished to reserve publicised applications to cases of fundamental importance. The Council issued a guideline which accounts in detail for the Competition Act and the public sector.

The Competition Authority and Section 20 of the Act on Charge Cards
In 1998, in co-operation with the department of the Ministry of Business and Industry and the National Consumer Agency of Denmark, the Competition Authority implemented a survey and analysis which has led to the submission of a proposal on amendment of Section 20 of the Act on Charge Cards. The background for the proposal is an increasing desire to be able to use the charge card in connection with electronic trade, including trade via the Internet. The bill was enacted in April of 1999.

The amendment means that the Competition Authority shall have powers to interfere in the event of unreasonable fees, etc.

User survey of case handling and services
In the second half of 1998, the Authority carried out a user survey in the field of competition. Attorneys, undertakings and associations that had had cases decided by the Authority within the past 12 months were asked about their opinion of the Authority's casehandling, services and professional standards. The user survey provided the following main results:

In general, the outcome of the study is considered as good, particularly in the actual areas of duration of case handling and service level, where user satisfaction is the highest.

In some areas, trade awareness and legal and economic competence, user satisfaction is lower. It is very likely that it will be difficult to increase the satisfaction rate of the Authority's trade awareness as undertakings will always have higher knowledge than the Authority.

For the coming period, the Authority has opted for an improvement of the legal and economic competence. Over a span of 3-4 years, it is the objective that the average user satisfaction in the areas of financial competence and legal competence shall exceed 70\%.

The user survey will be conducted again in 1999 and expanded to include the areas of energy and public procurement.

The EU-area
The Authority is a member of the Advisory Committees, which the EU Commission is to consult prior to making decisions in competition and merger cases. Moreover, the Authority assists the Commission when it conducts unannounced control inspections with Danish undertakings.

With the new Competition Act and the plans of the Commission to increase decentralised application of the EU regulations, a strengthening has taken place of the co-operation between the Competition Authority and the Commission, which in several cases has transferred cases to the Competition Authority.

The decisions of the Commission serve to prove that undertakings, which do not observe the competition regulation, are dealt with efficiently. Thus, the Commission has imposed large fines i.a. on Danish undertakings that violated the EU regulations on prohibitions against anti-competition agreements and abuse of a dominant position.

The merger area saw an increase in the number of notifications to the Commission of planned mergers. The majority of the mergers will be approved by the Commission, possibly subject to various structural undertakings, for instance, divestment of certain specific activities. The Authority participates in the hearing of a number of the cases in the Advisory Committee.

 

User survey 1998

Positive or very
positive replies

Negative or
very negative replies

 

Subject:

per cent of total

Duration of case handling
Reasoning sufficient
Information before decision
Impartiality of Authority
Getting in touch by phone
Returning calls
Service level in general
Intelligibility of letters
Legal competence
Economic competence
Trade awareness

70
72
67
56
96
96
84
92
62
53
46

28
28
27
35
2
2
8
8
30
24
40

 

 

The DAF case
A complaint to the Commission concerning a circular of the Association of Danish Car Dealers (Danmarks Automobilforhandler Forening (DAF)) concerning dealer mark-ups from 1998 was referred to the Competition Council, which made a decision in the case. The Competition Council ordered DAF to issue a correction circular concerning dealer mark-up in connection with sale to other EU citizens. In the circular, DAF was to point out to its members that even though in principle they are entitled to fix their own prices and mark-ups, it does not mean that they are entitled as general practice to claim a higher price merely because the buyer is residing outside Denmark.

 

The preinsulated pipes cartel
In the case concerning the preinsulated pipes cartel, ten European producers of preinsulated district-heating pipelines were fined a total of 92.21 million ECU (approx. 690 million DKK), because they had entered into a secret price and marketing agreement in violation of the prohibition against anticompetitive agreements - Article 81(1) EC. The cartel included the following undertakings with production plants in Denmark: ABB, Løgstør Rør A/S, Tarco Energi A/S and Dansk Industri A/S.

OECD
The Competition Authority is participating in the competition committee of the OECD and in three working parties under the committee. They deal with competition and regulation, international co-operation and trade and competition.

The interaction between trade policy and competition policy has received substantially higher priority with the OECD, and should also be seen as an input to the work taking place within the WTO on the same subject.

In 1998, the OECD issued a recommendation on hardcore cartels. It is to encourage co-operation among competition authorities, so that together they may combat restrictive trade practices internationally. This particularly applies to violations such as price fixing agreements, market sharing, etc.

The OECD has initiated a survey of deregulation systems and reforms in individual OECD countries. The project is described as "the Regulatory Reform Review". As part of the project, Denmark will be assessed by the OECD in 1999. Preparations started as early as 1998 where the Authority - together with a large part of the central administration - has contributed with input to the OECD report on Denmark. It will be published before the end of 1999.

1.2 Public procurement and state aid

The Authority is monitoring that the EU public procurement rules are observed. The monitoring takes place, i.a., by the Authority's receipt of complaints from undertakings and organisations concerning tenders for public procurement. The number of complaints handled in 1998 was 61. If there are sufficient grounds for suspicion, the Authority contacts the principal concerned and through negotiations attempts to legalise the procedure. If it is not successful, the Authority may submit the case to the Complaints Board for Public Procurement. The Authority has no formal decision making competence in the area of public procurement.

EU initiative
In 1998, the EU Commission announced what is going to happen in the years ahead for the purpose of opening the national public procurement markets to competition from suppliers from other member states. The principal lines in the announcement are focused on specifying and simplifying the code of practice, making the procedures flexible, strengthening the enforcement of the rules, and stimulating the application of electronic communication. In addition, the member states and the European business sector are encouraged to contribute actively towards these objectives.

The Authority has anticipated this development. In 1996, an initiative was implemented the purpose of which is to improve the opportunities of Danish business life to have a share of public procurement contracts in other countries. Undertakings are often encountering barriers when they submit tenders for public procurement abroad. In such events the Authority is ready to assist in ensuring that public procurement rules are observed. The initiative is based on the close contact of the Authority with the competition authorities in eight other countries and with the Commission.

One of the reasons why public procurement cases across borders come up is that the rules are interpreted differently. In 1998 the Authority initiated a pilot project with participation from six EU member states with the purpose of ensuring a more unilateral understanding of the public procurement rules. This also includes development and testing of models for better enforcement of the rules in the individual counties. The Commission supports the project and in its abovementioned announcement referred to the project as the first attempt towards having a well-functioning single market for public procurement.

State aid
The Authority offers advice to the authorities concerning issues of state aid and may provide recommendations but it cannot make decisions. It is up to the Commission and the Court of Justice to make the final decision as to whether a given arrangement constitutes state aid, and whether such an arrangement may be approved.

In connection with the advisory function, an advisory group has been established where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice have fixed seats. Other ministries participate on an ad hoc basis.

In addition, the Authority holds the chairmanship and serves as secretariat in the "crossministerial state aid group". A majority of the ministries are represented in the group which has been established to ensure experience exchange in the area, among other things.

In 1996, the Commission took the initiative to rearrange the state aid control with a view to making a more transparent, coherent and efficient policy.

 

1.3 Energy price Committees

The provisions in the Danish Electricity Supply Act and the Heat Supply Act concerning price fixing and supply conditions for power, district heating and natural gas are enforced by the Competition Authority. Decisions are made by two committees, the Electricity Price Committee and the Gas and Heating Price Committee, that have been set up by the Minister for Environment and Energy. The Authority presents cases involving fundamental and new problems to the two committees.
In 1998 considerable efforts were put into the preparation of the coming energy reform. In this connection, the Authority participated in a number of crossministerial committees.

The Energy Price Committees may interfere in prices and conditions if they are unreasonable, if they are fixed in violation of the "non-profit" principle, or if they are assumed to lead to an application of energy that is uneconomical to society.

In June 1998, the Authority published a report on Competition in the Energy Sector, and in December a report on benchmarking was published.
1998 saw an increase in the number of new cases whereas the number of completed cases declined. In 1998, the unit for energy gave high priority to the work with the energy reform and it had to transfer resources to this work from case handling.

 

Production figures energy acts

 

1995

1996

1997

1998

 

Number of new cases
Number of completed cases

403
--

516
450

439
423

684
388

Electricity
In the electricity area the majority of the work was concentrated on making the liberalisation process function.

In a liberalised electricity market, the so-called system operators play a vital part. The system operators are to determine prices of the main transmission network and lay down conditions for access to the network. Legislation requires the system operators to act independently of commercial interests in the remaining electricity area. The Electricity Price Committee therefore carefully followed the actions of the system operators in order to ensure that no commercial confusion was made with production and distribution interests.

The Committee has dealt with the price fixing of the two system operators in the main network. First of all, they dealt with the price fixing for the so-called balance power and in addition a specific assessment of the price level of the secondary network which is made available to the system operators.

Both system operators have chosen a tariff model according to which the entire network is considered as a whole where payment has to be made in order to get into and to extract from the network. In spite of this, the system operators fixed tariffs for the sea-bed cables to Norway, Sweden and Germany or on the Jutland border to Germany - the so-called border tariffs. The Committee instructed the system operators to cancel the announced border tariffs as the cables there must be taken to constitute part of the total main transmission network. However, the Committee found that it was legal to introduce special tariffs on those sections of the network - including the sea-bed cables - where there were capacity problems.

The Act enumerates a number of public service obligations, the payment for which the system operators shall undertake to distribute equally on all electricity consumers in Denmark. This equal payment is ensured through a distribution of the so-called priority production to all customers in the areas of Eltra and Elkraft System, respectively. The Committee has also assessed the price fixing for this so-called priority production.

 

Reader survey
KonkurrenceNyt

Very satisfied
and satisfied

Less satisfied
and not satisfied

Don't know
and other

 

 ------------- \% -------------

Overall assessment
Expert content
Layout

91
91
81

5
3
11

4
6
8

 

Reader survey
KonkurrenceNy

Very
reliable

Fairly
reliable

Don't know
and other

 

 ------------- \% -------------

Reliability

88

5

7

 

Gas and Heating
In the area of gas and heating a number of different types of cases has been dealt with. Here we wish to mention only one case which both in 1998 and earlier had significant importance for the district heating area.

The Committee has decided that in the event of delivery of hot water from one producer to another producer or distributor, the price shall not exceed the lowest of:

  • either the costdetermined price with the supplier
  • or the substitution price that may be calculated at the buyer's own production or purchase from third party

 

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